This paper analyses the impact of economic conditions on Portuguese local electoral outcomes. We use two extensive datasets to estimate an economic voting model which accounts for the possibility that different levels of government have different levels of responsibility for economic outcomes and for clarity of government responsibility.
Introduction
This paper analyzes economic voting in Portuguese local elections. The main purpose of the paper is to investigate whether economic conditions affect local electoral outcomes in a way that is consistent with the responsibility hypothesis. Since Portuguese local governments are responsible for improving the well-being of the population that resides in the municipality and have a wide range of opportunities for intervention that affects local economic activity, we expect that they will be held accountable for local economic performance. Having no jurisdiction over national economic policies, local governments should not, in principle, be held responsible for national economic performance. That is, according to the responsibility hypothesis, national economic conditions are only expected to affect the popularity and votes of the national government. But, as noted by Carsey and Wright (1998) , the electorate may wish to reward, or punish the national government in second tier (local) elections. Thus, it is possible that the votes received by local governments headed by the party that controls the national government are affected by national economic conditions. Although Veiga and Veiga (2010) In order to analyze the electoral accountability of Portuguese local governments, we estimate a vote function that models the effects of the economic environment taking into account the relationship between local and national governments and clarity of responsibility constraints. We start by testing whether the votes received by local incumbents are affected or not by national economic outcomes in a model that differentiates local governments affiliated with the party that rules the nation from other municipal incumbents. We hypothesize that these affiliated governments may be subject to political accountability effects. Partisan effects are also tested for in order to check if local authorities' ideological orientation affect electoral outcomes. We then proceed to test for the importance of regional economic indicators in the vote function, assuming that more clarity of responsibility may strengthen economic voting. Finally, the crosssectional data is used to investigate the impact of local unemployment on local electoral outcomes, and as a robustness check of the panel data results.
The article is organized as follows. The Section 2 discusses economic voting in local elections. Section 3 presents a short tour on some aspects of Portuguese elections. Section 4 describes the model and dataset used. The panel data results obtained are presented in 4 section 5, while section 6 reports the cross section results for the unemployment rate.
Finally, conclusions are presented in section 7.
Economic Voting in Local Elections
There are good reasons to suppose that local economic conditions influence national electoral results. Voters may use the local environment as a proxy for the general situation of the country or/and think that the policies implemented by the national government actually have a significant effect in the local economy. Although the number of papers that analyzes the importance of local economic indicators in legislative electoral results is relatively small, 4 they generally confirm that both national and local economic conditions are important in explaining voting. However, in the literature on local elections the results found do not exhibit such a consensus. Studies like the ones from Atkeson and Partin (1995) , Hansen (1999) , Squire and Fastnow (1994) for the US, highlight the importance of the regional economy, while Remmer and Gelineau (2003) for Argentina, Belanger and Galineau (2005) for Canada, and Peltzman (1987) and Kone and Winters (1993) for the US, find evidence in favor of the importance of national, but not subnational economic conditions.
One key issue when addressing economic voting in local elections is the viability of the responsibility hypothesis. With national elections, no matter which level of the economy we consider, there are arguments supporting the hypothesis that incumbents will be rewarded or punished based on economic performance. With municipal elections the formulation of the responsibility hypothesis is more problematic. One can argue that 5 governments should be held accountable only for economic results over which they exert some control (Anderson, 2006 At the subnational level, both the central government and the local authorities can be held responsible for the economic conditions, creating a problem of clarity of responsibility for voters. According to Powell and Whitten (1993) , factors that undermine the clarity of incumbent policymakers' responsibility remove the effects of economic variables on election outcomes. In local elections, the voters' task of assessing which economic results are affected by local government policies and which are determined by central authorities can vary in difficulty across municipalities and across time. The most favorable scenario for assessing responsibility would occur when the same party heads national and the local governments and both govern with majorities. The least favorable scenario for assessing responsibility would occur when different parties rule at local and centralized governmental levels, and rule is by coalitions rather than majorities. If the 6 reward/punishment mechanism is important in local elections outcomes, one should expect to find it at least in the first case. As clarity of responsibility decreases, especially if the party ties between both governments are broken, the economic dimension may disappear from the voters' decision making processes. Portuguese local governments, in which the mayor is the principal decision maker, are responsible for the organization of the territory, social and economic development, and the task of supplying local public goods such as water, transportation, housing, healthcare, education and culture 9 . Their wide range of intervention makes them responsible for the well-being of the population that resides in the municipality. The fact that they are of substantial importance in local economic activity, potentially ties the municipal government's electoral fortune to the economic environment.
Brief characterization of Portuguese elections
7 Freguesias are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal. The president and council members are elected directly by the voters living in the area. 8 The Hondt method is a highest averages method for allocating seats in party-list proportional representation. 9 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments. 1997, 1993, 1989, 1985, 1982, 1979, , 278 ,...
Data and Model Specification
GV , is the percentage of votes obtained in municipality i by the local incumbent government's principal party in the election for the Town Council and E i ECO , is a set of national and/or local economic variables that may affect votes for the local government's party. Then, to control for non economic factors we include a set of additional explanatory variables.
E i
POP , is a discrete variable reflecting the size of the municipality 13 . In principle, higher vote shares are harder to obtain in more populous municipalities. Thus, we expect a negative coefficient for population.
ENP , is the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) index for the effective number of political parties/forces that represent electoral lists in each municipality. It controls for political fragmentation and electoral competitiveness, which are expected to be negatively related to the vote 12 This is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers almost all privately owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included). 13 It equals 1 for Lisbon and Porto, 2 for other municipalities with population over 40000, 3 for municipalities with population between 10000 and 40000, and 4 for the remaining municipalities. 10 share of the incumbent local government party. Given the dynamic structure of the model, it is not appropriate to estimate equation (1) using OLS. In both the fixed and random effects settings, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, even if we assume that the disturbances are not themselves autocorrelated. According to Arellano and Bond (1991) , 14 Evidence of popularity erosion over time in office was already documented in the seminal paper of Mueller (1970) . Veiga (2004 and 
Panel Data Empirical Results
The first two sets of estimations presented include only national economic indicators and the control variables. 17 The inflation rate and the unemployment rate are lagged one year and they are also used as average percentage annual changes over the entire term to test the relevant time horizon for Portuguese voters. Results using System-GMM are shown in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 about here]
There is evidence that the national economy affects local governments' electoral results, although it seems that Portuguese voters do not attach great importance to the more distant past, confirming the findings of Veiga and Veiga (2010) for legislative elections. Unemployment only affects local governments that belong to the party that holds power at the national level and the effect is found to be stronger when they are both 12 majority governments. Although municipal incumbents have little control over the macroeconomic environment, they seem to be held accountable, as an increase in national-level unemployment or inflation affects negatively their chances of reelection.
Thus, as suggested by Carsey and Wright (1998) , the electorate tends to penalize (reward) the party of the national government in local elections for bad (good) economic outcomes. Furthermore, the penalty/reward is stronger for governments that enjoy greater power and responsibility over economic policy (majority governments), as Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest.
The results also indicate that the inflation rate negatively affects local authorities that are not affiliated with the central government. We think that this may be related to some degree of misperceived accountability. As the national inflation is taken as a benchmark for price increases in some public goods that are provided by the municipality, such as public transportation, healthcare, education and water, voters may attribute these higher prices to direct policy decisions emanating from the local governments.
The control variables exhibit the expected signs. The size of the population, the effective number of parties, and time in office have negative effects, while there is a positive effect on votes (which we attribute to personality effects) when the mayor decides to run for reelection. Although the autoregressive component does not suggest high persistence of vote shares, it is statistically significant and positively signed.
In Table 3 , we consider the possibility that left and right parties will be subjected to differing standards in the way that they are rewarded and punished for economic conditions. Powell and Whitten (1993) claim that a government should be held more responsible for those variables that it, or its constituency, care about the most, while 13 Swank's (1993) partisan hypothesis assumes that higher unemployment rates should increase the demand for left-wing governments, as they are more prone to fight unemployment, and that higher inflation should increase the demand for right-wing governments (which will fight harder to decrease it). In the reported estimations, the partisan effects are modeled by the inclusion of dummies indicating the simultaneous control of the national and of the local governments by the center-left party (socialist party -PS) or by the center-right party (social democratic party -PSD).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The effects of economic variables found to be statistically significant are limited to the short run economic performance. Results indicate that, when the same political party controls the national and the local government, the socialists (PS) are more penalized in municipal elections than the social democrats (PSD) for higher unemployment rates.
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While a 1% increase in the unemployment rate reduces the vote percentage of PS local governments by 0.407%, the effect is half this amount for PSD local governments.
Regarding inflation, even though there is a slight distinction between parties, a post estimation Wald test rejected the statistical significance of this difference. These results are in line with Powell and Whitten's (1993) ideological responsibility hypothesis, as the center-left party (PS) tends to be more penalized for increases in unemployment than the center-right party (PSD).
Regional and local economic indicators are included in the estimations of The only statistically significant municipal economic variable is the growth of municipal wages, for the case where responsibility is most clearly inferred (local and national majority governments of the same party). In other cases where voters have difficulty in sorting out which party should be held responsible, the lack of effects is a plausible result.
We also tested the hypothesis of partisan effects with the economic variables used in Table 4 , but all the interactions proved to be statistically insignificant, failing to support a finding of any partisan effects at the regional level. In order to economize space, we chose not to report these results, which are available from the authors upon request.
Cross-Section empirical results for the unemployment rate
This section uses a different dataset in order to test for the effects of freguesia and municipal level unemployment rates. We made two changes to the model used in the previous section. First, the population category variable by municipality was replaced by a dummy variable (Urban Areas) which takes the value of one for the freguesias that are manly urban areas, and zero otherwise. Second, due to potential problems of endogeneity, 20 the effective number of parties was replaced by a dummy variable accounting for municipalities where non party organizations present electoral lists (Non
party list).
Due to the cross sectional nature of the data, albeit is no possible to distinguish between partisan and responsibility effects. In 2001, the ruling national party was PS, so the interaction dummies refer to the simultaneous governance of the center-left. We do not test for clarity effects because the lack of time variability created multicolinearity problems between the interaction dummies.
We use three alternative estimation methods that try to solve the typical problem of heteroscedasticity found in cross section analysis 21 . The first is the standard OLS regression with robust standard errors. The second is the weighted least squares (WLS) method proposed by Madalla (1983) that identifies the heteroscedastic process and proposes a logistic transformation to the dependent variable 22 . This method takes into account the differences in population between freguesias, thus reporting more efficient estimators than OLS. In the third method, after the WLS, we use a Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) 23 in order to control for other unknown factors that may be causing 20 As mentioned above, the effective number of parties was treated as an endogenous variable in the System-GMM estimations. As the estimation methods used in this section do not account for endogeneity, we preferred to replace that variable by an alternative that does not suffer from potential endogeneity problems. 21 It is necessary to account for heteroscedasticity because both the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests rejected the homoscedasticity assumption in our model.
). See Dubin and Kaslow (1996) for an application of this method. 23 Starting with the estimated logistic model, we correct for other potential sources of heteroscedasticity using the feasible generalized least square method proposed by Wooldridge (2003). heteroscedasticity. These last two methods are less vulnerable to heteroscedasticity than OLS.
The estimation results, shown in Table 5 , are consistent with the panel data findings regarding the effects of economic and non economic variables. There is strong evidence that local authorities affiliated with the central government are held more accountable for high freguesia and municipal unemployment rates than those unaffiliated. Although the results confirm the political accountability hypothesis, municipal unemployment also has a negative impact on governments without political ties to the ruling national party, an effect we lose in the freguesia regressions when controlling heteroscedasticity more effectively (when using WLS/FGLS). This indicates the presence of the traditional responsibility mechanism when the unemployment aggregation level corresponds to the local authority's jurisdiction. These different results may also be related to the fact that a significant portion of the electorate is not likely to vote and work in the same freguesia, a scenario more likely to occur when we think in terms of municipalities. Overall, the analysis of the 2001 municipal elections confirms the importance of the local unemployment rate in the Portuguese government's vote function.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the economic determinants of local electoral results in Portugal. We found that both national and regional economic conditions influence electoral outcomes. Our results are consistent with the responsibility hypothesis and are in line with previous findings for Portuguese legislative elections.
Even though local authorities have little control over the national economic environment, our results show that there is a mechanism of political accountability present at municipal elections. When the same party governs at national and local levels, the local governments are punished when the national unemployment increases, and are more affected by inflation than the local governments which are not affiliated with the national government party. Nevertheless, our data suggests that the latter are affected by inflation changes, a result that might be related to effects on national inflation observed through prices charged for the provision of local public goods. Finally, we find support for the proposition that government ideology affects the relationship between national unemployment rates and election outcomes. Concretely, the empirical results support Powell and Whitten's (1993) hypothesis that governments are held more accountable for the economic variables that they care about the most. That is, when the same political party controls the national and the local governments, the socialists (PS -center-left) are more penalized in municipal elections than the social democrats (PSD -center-right) for higher unemployment rates.
Portuguese local governments have been assuming greater and greater responsibilities in the areas of economic policy and provision of public goods. Because local governments are closer to their population and more aware of local problems than the national government, this decentralization process can generate a more efficient allocation of resources.
Among subnational economic variables, we find that only municipal wages seem to influence votes in local elections, strictly in situations where municipal and national governments belong to the same party and are both in a majority position. These results
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show that the clarity of responsibility is important for economic voting when evaluating economic performance at the regional level.
Finally, the results obtained when using of cross sectional data clearly indicate that the local unemployment rate affects electoral outcomes. Local governments are held accountable for local unemployment rates, and the effect is stronger for governments politically tied to the national incumbent, confirming the importance of controlling for simultaneous governance when analyzing economic voting in local elections. 
